This paper builds on recent work that shows how financial sector outcomes are affected by the provision of information by financial and other entities. In particular, it shows that an indicator of economic transparency is positively related to higher levels of private credit and a lower share of non-performing loans even after accounting for factors commonly believed to influence financial sector development in cross-country empirical estimation. Timely access to economic data allows investors to make better decisions on investments and to better monitor banks' financial health. Greater economic transparency raises accountability and lowers corruption in bank lending.
Introduction
The type and abundance of information in economic markets affects economic outcomes. Ackerlof's seminal (1970) article on the market for lemons, Spence's (1976) work on the impact of signaling in labor markets, Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) work on insurance markets and Stiglitz's (1974) paper on sharecropping present just some of the varied informational problems arising in market economies and some of the mechanisms which markets have evolved to either reduce information asymmetries or to reduce risks associated with operating under less than perfect information. Less than perfect information allows some agents to obtain benefits at the expense of others or may make all agents worse off if it leads to inefficient outcomes. This paper examines whether better information on overall economic conditions supports financial development.
Because of the public good nature of information, non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability, there is a presumption that information will be "underproduced" in competitive market economies. There are also externalities associated with the acquisition of information since it is not easy (or is sometimes not possible) to appropriate the returns to collecting information. The impact of asymmetries in information among different agents in financial markets has been thoroughly covered in a number of studies. As Stiglitz (1993) notes, the allocation of capital and monitoring its use are essentially information problems. Banks need information about potential lenders.
Banks that have superior information on borrowers may not be willing to share it with others. Or banks may be unwilling to invest in obtaining information that they cannot "keep" from others if they cannot earn a return sufficient to justify the costs of obtaining information. Within the financial system itself, information about the solvency of financial institutions and the management of these institutions is of great value to investors/depositors. But one person's knowledge about the impending insolvency of a financial institution (or poor bank management) does not subtract from another's knowledge. The public good characteristics of this information mean that there will be an undersupply of monitoring. Externalities related to lending (once one bank lends to a borrower, everyone else knows he is creditworthy) or to the perceptions regarding the financial health of banks (once one bank fails investors may conclude that other banks are in bad financial condition) also abound.
There are several papers that expound on the consequences of information asymmetries in financial markets. Ackerlof (1970) uses the example of credit markets in developing countries where local lenders (who have better, though still imperfect information) charge seemingly exhorbitant interest rates. New lenders (outsiders) wishing to compete with these lenders generally end up making losses when they enter the market because they have less information on borrowers than local lenders who know their town and clients. Information asymmetries in this case mean that financial institutions tend towards oligopolistic behavior since they will tend to deal with clients they know; potential entrants are kept out because of informational barriers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed how information imperfections can lead to rationing behavior in credit markets. In their model, since lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers with different risk profiles and because borrowers facing higher risk will also tend to borrow at higher interest rates, there will be credit rationing in markets. Lenders' expected profits will not be a monotonically increasing function of the interest rate charged. In Townsend's model (1979) , banks compile information and economize on verifying borrower conditions, and they also economize on monitoring costs (see also Diamond, 1984) which would be much higher if individual lenders had to evaluate potential borrowers. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 , conclude that there would be no bank runs in an economy with perfect information on banks since fully informed depositors would expect higher interest rates from risky banks and thus curtail risky behavior by banks. In their paper, only "shocks" would lead to bank runs. Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that in a world of multiple lenders, each bank may be discouraged from monitoring the borrower closely to avoid free-riding by other lenders. But the costs of multiple lending relationships escalate if each lender or potential lender does not have information on the borrower's debt status, since the default risk is a function of the overall indebtedness of a borrower, not just his borrowing from one lender. Each lender is also threatened by possible future debt commitments the borrower may take on (Bizer and De Marzo, 1992) . Thus, Ongena and Smith, 1998 , show that the number of bank relationships has a negative impact on the availability of credit. This suggests that if lenders pool their information, the total amount of credit extended might increase (see also Bennardo and Pagano, 2001) .
A number of papers discuss how wider information sharing among firms may affect the financial system. Jappelli and Pagano (1993) discuss how the reduction of adverse selection problems through information sharing would tend to reduce defaults, though the effect on overall lending is ambiguous since lending to good borrowers may increase but may not be sufficient to offset the decline in lending to bad borrowers. In another model, Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that greater exchange of information about borrower types means banks restrain their ability to obtain future informational rents and in their model, interest rates are lower and lending is higher than in the case with lower information. This is because information sharing means lower market power. Lower market power translates into an expectation of lower interest rates and raises the incentive to perform on the part of borrowers. Thus defaults are lowered and lending rises. Since lenders are required to participate in public credit registries, their coverage of bank loans tends to be universal, though they may fail to include data provided by credit card companies and other financial companies and they may not record loans below a certain size. A credit bureau's information is limited to members. They tend to provide reliable data -timeliness and honesty is forced by threatening expulsion from the group in case of non-compliance. They also provide information on consumer loans and small-business loans. Credit bureaus allow better pricing and targeting of loans, level the informational playing field (and so raise competition and reduce moral hazard, that is they reduce the incentives to default). Jappelli and Pagano (2000) find that public credit registers are more likely to arise where private arrangements are weak and that information sharing arrangements are more likely to arise where creditor rights are poorly protected (to compensate for poor protection ex-post).
2 But private arrangements may also serve as entry barriers -Jappelli and Pagano assert that in Mexico the banks have a vertically integrated arrangement with a monopolistic credit bureau system that prevent new banks (having an informational disadvantage) from entering. In an empirical study covering several countries Jappelli and Pagano (2002) find that information sharing leads to an increase in lending. This relationship holds even after accounting for country size and growth rate, and variables capturing respect for property rights and respect for the law. Galindo and Miller, 2001, find that improved assessment of credit risk as enabled by more information sharing translates into higher lending. Pinheiro and Cabral (2001) report that the postdated check market operates without collateral, without personal guarantees, and without legal sanctions of any type. It is based on an information sharing mechanism (a black list of people who write checks without funds to back them). Trivelli, Alvarado and Galarza (2001) find that the development of a public rating register in Peru has encouraged lenders to shift away from exclusive reliance on collateral towards information based lending.
The design of institutions such as credit registries discussed above affects the type of monitoring that takes place in countries since they affect the amount of information produced and disseminated. Governments design and implement regulations that provide access to information by concerned agents and in some cases may be the sole repository of such information. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) Better knowledge of economic variables may also help lenders distinguish between different types of projects/borrowers-for example some borrowers may be more affected by exchange rate changes than others. Some may be more affected by the government's fiscal decisions than others. Knowing how different macroeconomic variables are evolving in a timely manner assists lenders in differentiating between borrowers; they will lend more to those who are expected to do better given the information received on macroeconomic outcomes. They will accordingly lend less to others and the overall effect may be higher or lower lending. Similarly on the demand side, borrowers who see better outcomes for their projects will enter the market where others will leave. The net result on private credit through this channel is ambiguous though the portfolio should improve (non-performing loans fall).
Knowledge of economic conditions would help in managing lending portfolios and thereby potentially improve the performance of the portfolio (and reduce non-performing loans). Knowledge of economic conditions affecting banking profitability would help investors and regulators in banks to differentiate between banks that are unhealthy due to internal mismanagement and those whose condition is related to economic outcomes.
Thus up-to-date information on economic conditions could have a positive effect on financial sector development. This paper contends that better information on economic variables lowers risk and helps lenders and borrowers make better judgements about borrowing and lending decisions. Overall credit may rise or fall, but bank portfolios should improve.
This paper uses an indicator that reflects the timeliness of economic data reported by governments-called the transparency indicator (Islam, 2006) as an indicator of knowledge available to the general public on key economic variables. It links the timeliness of data as measured by this indicator to financial sector development. In the following section, the paper lays out in more detail why information on economic outcomes may lead to overall financial sector development, though it does not go so far as to build a theoretical model showing these links. This is followed by a description of the data and empirical strategy. The next section describes the results. 
Theoretical Justification
In most of the finance literature, information asymmetries are of two types: (a) lack of information on borrower type and limited ability to monitor borrower actions lead to adverse selection and moral hazard; and (b) insufficient checks and balances (incentives and penalties) on bank owners/directors and supervisors, and the presence of moral hazard, lead to poor bank portfolios and bank failures. Usually, the literature has focused on how improving information asymmetries between (a) regulators and depositors on the one hand and bank management /owners on the other, or (b) lenders and borrowers can improve bank portfolios. The primary information asymmetry that this paper focuses on is that between the state and private agents. But this information asymmetry has consequences for how lenders and borrowers behave. The government knows the economic situation but either for political reasons (for example, the desire to hide bad outcomes) or simply because producing and disseminating information has costs greater than expected (or internalized) benefits, they do not widely disseminate economic information in a timely manner. The information published by government may not reflect the current situation. 5 Yet the profitability of investment (and therefore the probability of default on bank lending) depends on key macro-economic variables such as the exchange rate, wage rates, interest rates, inflation, the fiscal deficit (or expenditures and taxes) and GDP growth. None of these outcomes are known with certainty and both borrowers and lenders face greater risk in their activities when they have poorer knowledge of economic variables.
Suppose the expected financial return to the borrower (and therefore the lender), ER, depends on a risk factor r, which depends on overall economic conditions and other conditions particular to the project in question, p: ER=ER(r,p). If we suppose that r is affected differently for different projects (for example, exchange rate depreciation would not affect both exporters and non-exporters equally), then we would have a distribution of ERs which depend on the realization of several macro variables. If borrowers and lenders know how r changes with economic variables, then knowing about economic outcomes will help both lenders and borrowers better assess the return on their projects. In particular, if the distribution of r changes with new knowledge then lenders will make better portfolio choices since they will estimate different expected returns for each project. Overall lending may rise or fall depending on the realizations of economic outcomes and how these outcomes affect the distribution of projects and bank profits. 5 In such a situation it is still possible to imagine that some private agents (e.g. those connected closely with government agents) have preferential access to information.
Suppose there are two projects with the same expected return but different risk features: B and D, B having higher risk at the current knowledge of economic outcomes.
Suppose new knowledge reveals that the risk of an exchange rate depreciation has increased and suppose that D's return depends on exchange rate changes (depreciation reduces earnings) while B's does not. With this new knowledge, the relative expected return on D will fall and lenders will choose to finance more of type B than D, ceteris paribus 6 . The expected return on B will rise and profits of the bank will rise (they will have fewer defaults) since they will have made better choices than if they had assumed an unchanged situation between D and B. If higher profits affect the supply of lending -then we can assume that greater economic transparency will increase the amount of credit available in the economy at each interest rate, ceteris paribus. It should also reduce the ratio of non-performing loans.
Suppose borrowers have a better knowledge of economic outcomes; they too can reassess the type of project in which they will invest. Ceteris paribus, borrowers facing reduced expected earnings will not apply for the loan (demand will fall) while those with higher expected earnings (D) will demand more loans. Again overall demand may rise or fall. That is, at any given interest rate charged the demand curve may shift inwards or outwards. If borrowers and lenders had already purchased contingent contracts to hedge exchange rate risk, better knowledge of exchange rates may have less of an effect than in the case where contingent contracts are not available.
What role does corruption play? Suppose with corruption in bank lending and given the overall level of credit extended in the economy, the portfolio can be divided into those loans in which corruption plays a part LC, and those in which there is no corruption, L1.
Suppose officials accept bribes for a certain fraction of loans made. Then the return to the officials (as distinct from the bank owners) would be bribes and to the bank, the expected returns from LC loans, ELC. If it is assumed that bribes are made because the loan would yield lower expected returns to the bank than other investments, then the overall returns to the bank from its portfolio of investments would be lower; the return to the now corrupt lending officials would be higher where ELC+bribes would have to be the minimum overall return to the borrower. The share of non-performing loans may be higher in this scenario. But greater transparency means that it will be easier to detect and predict the actual performance of loans. This would also help monitor cases where loans are not made on the basis of expected returns but bribes: ability to monitor (and penalize corrupt officials), should reduce the incidence of bribes and of LC. 7 In other words, firms in general would see corruption as less of a constraint on access to finance when bank officials' decisions can be evaluated better and officials can be held accountable.
However, this conclusion only holds if there are penalties (reputational or otherwise) associated with greater corruption that is revealed by better monitoring.
Empirical Estimation and Data Used
The empirical estimation conducted in the first part of this paper can be represented by the following equation:
PC is the measure of financial development, or private credit over GDP. I also use the share of non-performing loans in lending values as another measure of financial sector development. T is the transparency indicator of interest, and X represents other variables affecting financial development. In determining both the choice of the financial development indicator and the variables to be put in X, I follow Barth, Caprio and Levine (BCL, 2004 (BCL, , 2006 . The transparency indicator is taken from Islam (2006) , and represents the availability of timely economic information in countries. 8 Legal origin has been shown to be an important factor determining financial development (see Beck, DemirgucKunt and Levine, 2003) and is therefore used as an explanatory variable. Legal origin is available rather than to assess the joint effect of disclosure and related incentives for monitoring. By adjusting the BCL index, I am constructing an index that is closer to the economic transparency indicator that is the main focus of the paper. 11 The adjusted index deals only with access to information while the unadjusted index (pmindex), which also includes a measure of the incentive to monitor, has a lower correlation with T. The first set of regressions using OLS are shown in their simplest form in Table 2 below using the main variables of interest, private credit and non-performing loans.
Greater economic transparency is associated with either a larger or better performing (as implied by the non-performing loan ratio) financial sector. 
Using Instrumental Variables
While Ethnic diversity, latitude, the share of the population that is catholic or muslim all turn out to be good instruments. Using ethnic diversity and latitude as instruments below, I find that greater transparency means better financial development. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in T is associated with a .57 standard deviation increase in the private sector to GDP ratio and a .41 decline in the non-performing loan ratio. Note that the adjusted BCL index (apmindex) is not significant. It is possible that in a country with overall better governance, economic transparency would not have an additional impact on financial development. I run the base regressions again controlling for measures of governance such as law and order and corruption. When supervisory indices and measures of governance are used as controls in the OLS specifications the coefficient on transparency remains strongly significant. Table 6 shows different IV specifications that include measures of governance. In all the specifications for the npl variable, T continues to be significant, indicating that better economic information helps sort good and poor projects. As controls, I also use the principal components of the supervisory and regulatory indices (as in BCL) -simple indices which sum over the different components were also tried and gave similar results.
However, in these specifications, the coefficient on T loses significance when pmindex pc, the complete BCL monitoring index, is included and instead the BCL index is significant. Interestingly, when apmindex is used instead, it is not significant. In addition, overall corruption in the economy is not significant. When law and order is used as the governance measure as a control, it is significant, but has the wrong sign for the npl variable and but now pmindex pc is no longer significant. T continues to be significant in most specifications. Table 7 shows the IV specification using law and order -transparency raises private credit and lowers non-performing loans. Note that corruption overall has no impact on either dependent variable while law and order is usually significant for higher levels of private credit. These results suggest that economic transparency is quite robustly related to better financial sector performance. The results in the various specifications also suggest that greater economic transparency may be a substitute for greater transparency within the financial system in the sense that both types of transparency allow market participants to judge the performance of banking portfolios and of banks. 
Part 2. Corruption in Bank Lending and Transparency

Descriptive Statistics and Estimation
In this section of the paper, I use and extend the estimation procedure in BDL (2005) to investigate whether economic transparency reduces corruption in bank lending.
BDL use both firm specific and country specific data to assess how corruption may hinder access to finance. Much of the firm specific data, including the data on corruption in bank lending comes from a WBES firm level survey that covers 81 countries.
The dependent variable, corruption in bank lending, comes from a questionnaire which attempts to identify if corruption is an obstacle to firms' access to finance. Bank corruption, is the response to the question: "How problematic is corruption of bank officials for the operation and growth of your business?" Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). 12% in the sample report 4, 12 % report 3, 19% report 2 and 57% report 1. The dependent variable for the next three IV probit models is a binary response model based on Bank Corruption -with 1(no obstacle) recoded as 0, and all the other values recoded as 1 (obstacle to various degrees). This grouping puts 57% in the first category and 43% in the second.
WBES data are useful in that they provide direct information on obstacles to financing, broad country and firm level coverage, and allow one to correct for both firm specific and country specific factors. Even after the inclusion of all these variables, I expect to find that greater transparency reduces corruption in lending because more information enables both supervisors and private agents to monitor behavior of bank officials and portfolios. Better monitoring enhances accountability of officials since there is a greater chance that corruption or other wrongdoing would be exposed and punished by clients or others. Table A1b in the appendix shows the correlation among the main variables and Table 8 shows the summary statistics for the variables. Table 9 shows the ordered probit and binary IV probit regressions. Controls for supervisory power, and private monitoring are included. The results in Table 9 below indicate that greater economic transparency reduces corruption in bank lending and should increase access to bank finance. These results are robust to the inclusion of several firm and country specific variables, though surprisingly, the coefficients on the supervisory indicators are not significant. In every specification, more transparency clearly reduces bank corruption-the results are robust across specifications. IV specification strengthens the results. Interestingly, exporting firms' access to credit is not hindered by bank corruption (they presumably have more potential sources of credit-such as trading partners). Restrictive supervisory practices are associated with more corruption in all specifications and the monitoring index, pmindex pc, with less. The private monitoring index is not significant in the IV specifications. 
Conclusion
This paper has estimated the impact of greater economic transparency on the financial sector, specifically on the availability of credit, the share of non-performing loans in the portfolio, and on corruption in bank lending. The results indicate that even after accounting for the usual measures of financial disclosure and information flow used in the literature, economic transparency has a significant positive and robust impact on private credit, and a negative and statistically significant impact on non-performing loans and corruption in bank lending. These results inform policy and validate the importance of resolving information asymmetries for financial sector development. 
